The High Court has upheld the lawfulness of the Home Office policy on good character in naturalisation applications, in a challenge brought by a refugee who originally entered the UK irregularly. The case is R (on the application of Ahmed Alibiari) v SSHD [2026] EWHC 1623 (Admin).
The judgment offers little that will assist people who applied under version 6 and were waiting to seek a reconsideration. Version 6 has since been updated, but the starting point remains the same: irregular travel to the UK indicates bad character, even where the person is later recognised as a refugee. Applicants may be still able to show reasons why citizenship should nonetheless be granted, but the court found no fault with the approach.
The changes between version 6 and 7, explained here by Jed, significantly clarify what the Home Office will consider to be acceptable reasons. This judicial review was not rendered academic by that update to the policy. Mr Alibiari could seek a reconsideration at a later point, and any such reconsideration would be considered under the earlier version 6. A finding that version 6 was unlawful could therefore still have benefitted him.
Background
Mr Alibiari fled Egypt and travelled through several European countries before entering the UK concealed in a lorry in 2016. He was 18 years old at the time. He explained that he had not claimed asylum on the continent because he had been told by an interpreter, friends and an agent that he would likely be returned to Egypt if he did so. He was recognised as a refugee in the UK.
Mr Alibiari later applied for British citizenship. Under section 6 of the British Nationality Act 1981, read with Schedule 1, a person may only be granted naturalisation as a British citizen if the Home Office is satisfied that they are of good character. The court summarised the policy:
a person applying for citizenship after 10 February 2025 will normally be refused citizenship if he (1) entered the United Kingdom illegally or (2) arrived in the United Kingdom without entry clearance or travel authorisation having made a dangerous journey (which included travelling by a small boat or concealed in a vehicle).
His application was nonetheless refused on the basis that he would not have had a valid defence under section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, had he been charged with illegal entry and that there was no other mitigation or evidence that would support an exceptional grant.
The grounds of challenge
Mr Alibiari challenged the policy on three grounds. First, that the policy misinterpreted the good character requirement and directed caseworkers to take unlawful decisions. Second, that it created a real risk of a breach of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (protection from discrimination), when read together with Article 8 of the Convention (the right to a family and private life). Third, that the policy was adopted in breach of the public sector equality duty.
All three grounds failed.
Why did the court consider the policy lawful?
On the first ground, the court reviewed the relevant caselaw and concluded that it is for the Home Office to decide what factors are relevant to good character, that the courts should not discourage the Home Secretary from setting a high standard, and there is a wide range of factors that may lawfully be considered. Irregular entry or arrival without entry clearance fell within those factors. It was also entitled to conclude that this would normally demonstrate a person lacks good character.Â
The court went on to acknowledge that some people have little control over the manner in which they enter the country. However, how the Home Secretary takes account of explanations for irregular entry or dangerous journeys is, in the court’s view, essentially a matter for her. She was not required to include an express statement that people who had entered in this way might nonetheless be of good character; this was clear when the policy was read as a whole.
The court went further, even suggesting she might make a distinction between people who specify their destination to people smugglers, versus those who simply pay smugglers to get them out. The extent to which people fleeing persecution have a free choice of bespoke smuggling services is, in the author’s view, highly questionable.
On the second ground, the direct discrimination argument was that refugees entering the UK to flee persecution had been treated in the same way as those entering illegally by choice. The court drew a distinction between the reasons why a person left their country of origin and the circumstances in which they travelled to the UK. Where the person had good reasons for travelling in the way that they did, this could be taken into account. It is worth noting that the judgment readily accepts a recurrent trope in public discourse about refugees – that they should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. Whether that obligation exists in international law has been explored in this previous post.
The indirect discrimination argument was that refugees are more likely to have entered the UK illegally than non-refugee applicants for citizenship. The court did not accept that the data showed this was the case. It went on to conclude that even if it did, there was an objective justification. Maintaining appropriate standards for access to citizenship was a legitimate aim. The policy was rationally connected to that aim, as illegal entry or irregular arrival ‘displays a disregard for the laws and processes governing entry to the country’.
The court considered less intrusive alternatives – such as excluding people who came to the UK before the policy was adopted, or disregarding illegal entry after a period of time – but reasoned these would have diluted the measure so much that the Home Office was effectively forced to adopt a different policy. The court concluded the measure was found to strike a fair balance. There was no entitlement to citizenship, refusal did not change the fact Mr Alibiari enjoyed protection as a refugee, and the interest of the community in ensuring new citizens were of good character outweighed the future acquisition of the rights or benefits citizenship would bring.
On the third ground, the court found the public sector equality duty applied. The impact assessment had considered the effect on race and sex. It identified a greater impact on people of certain racial backgrounds, but considered this justified and proportionate as it was based on a person’s conduct rather than race. It concluded there was no direct discrimination on grounds of sex, but considered the impact of the policy on women. There was no requirement to go any further. Arguments about indirect discrimination failed for the reasons the court had already given.
What next for people affected?
Refugees who entered the UK irregularly and those assisting them will want to carefully consider the current policy before shelling out on the application fee. In addition to Jed’s article outlining the updates to the policy and how the change impacts people who applied under version 6, Colin’s article here provides more general guidance on addressing bad character issues in British Citizenship applications.Â